by Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Mass .
Written in English
|Other titles||Bargaining, Cheap talk can matter in.|
|Statement||by Joseph Farrell, Robert Gibbons|
|Series||Working paper -- no. 482, Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) -- no. 482.|
|Contributions||Gibbons, Robert, 1958-, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||27 p. :|
|Number of Pages||27|
workingpaper department ofeconomics CHEAPTALKCARMATTERIF by JosephFarrell RobertGibbons BARGAINING No. "Cheap talk can matter in bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages , June. Joseph Farrell and Robert Gibbons., " Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining," Economics Working Papers , University of California at Berkeley. "Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt3qzxq, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. Robert Gibbons & Joseph Farrell, "Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining," Working papers , Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics. "Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining," Economics Working Papers , University of California at Berkeley. Farrell, Joseph & Gibbons, Robert, "Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt3qzxq, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
This paper describes an intuitive way in which cheap talk can matter in a twostage bargaining game in which talk may be followed by serious negotiation. The intuition that all buyers would claim to have low reservation prices is incorrect in our model. Instead, if good-faith participation is endogenously determined then the parties can use talk to trade off bargaining position against the. Journal Article: Cheap talk can matter in bargaining () Working Paper: Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining () Working Paper: Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining () This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title. Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text. Books and Chapters Software Components. Authors. JEL codes New Economics Papers. Advanced Search. EconPapers FAQ Archive maintainers FAQ Cookies at EconPapers. Format for printing. The RePEc blog The RePEc plagiarism page Cheap talk can matter in bargaining. Joseph Farrell and Robert Gibbons. Journal of Economic Theory, , vol. 48, issue 1. 1. Introduction. Economic models of bargaining behavior and actual bargaining behavior are often at variance with one another. In most models of bargaining, costless and unverifiable statements about private information and incredible threats about future actions are modeled as cheap talk and are only expected to affect beliefs and outcomes in specific situations.
Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining. Author(s): Farrell, Joseph; Gibbons, Robert; et al. Main Content Metrics Author & Article Info. Main Content. Download PDF to View View Larger. Thumbnails Document Outline Attachments. Previous. Next. Highlight all Match case. Whole words. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed main result is that the maximum amount of information transmission is. This paper shows an intuitive way that diplomatic cheap talk can matter in a single crisis between countries, especially when the bargaining game has multiple equilibria. Throughout the book. Request PDF | 'Cheap Talk' Diplomacy, Voluntary Negotiations, and Variable Bargaining Power | It is well known that during a crisis, unitary rational states have an incentive to misrepresent their.